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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court's jurisdiction rests upon Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
ISSUE 1: Did the trial court err in granting Appellee's motion for summary judgment? 
Standard of Review. De novo. "Because, by definition, a district court does not resolve 
issues of fact at summary judgment, we consider the record as a whole and review the 
district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, reciting all facts and fair inferences 
drawn from the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Poteet v. 
White, 2006"UT 63, \ 7, 147 P.3d439. 
Preservation for Appeal. R. at 663-665, 712-737. 
ISSUE 2: Did the trial court err when it excluded all of the expert testimony from 
Appellant's engineering expert? 
Standard of Review. Abuse of discretion as to the ruling to strike the proffered evidence, 
but de novo (for correctness) as to the trial court's interpretation of the legal standards 
used as a basis for striking the evidence. "The trial court has wide discretion in 
determining the admissibility of expert testimony. Accordingly, we disturb the district 
court's decision to strike expert testimony only when it exceeds the limits of 
reasonabihty. Our review of the district court's exercise of its discretion includes review 
to ensure that no mistakes of law affected a lower court's use of its discretion. Thus, if 
the district court erred in interpreting [the governing legal standard] when it [ruled on the 
request to strike the expert testimony at issue], it did not act within the limits of 
• • - l • • • • • • 
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reasonability, and we will not defer to the evidentiary decision." Eskelson v. Davis Hosp. 
&Med Ctr.9 2010 UT 59, ^  5, 242 P.3d 762 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
Preservation for Appeal: R. at 663-665, 712-737. 
ISSUE 3: Did the trial court err when it decided, without prior notice to the parties and 
without any agreement between the parties, that (1) Appellant would not have the time 
allowed by Rule 7(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to file a formal response to 
Appellee's Motion in Limine and (2) to rule on the Motion before receiving any formal 
response from Appellant, despite Appellant's entitlement to file such a response? 
Standard of Review: De novo. The Court of Appeals "review[s] the interpretation and 
application of a rule of procedure for correctness." Edwards v. Powder Mountain Water 
and Sewer, 2009 UT App 185, K 14, 214 P.3d 120; see also Adams v. State, 2005 UT 62, 
| 8, 123 P.3d 400 (conflating the correctness standard with de novo review). 
Preservation for Appeal: R. at 663-665, 712-737. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ETC, 
None. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff/Appellant Jason Ross ("Ross") filed a Complaint on February 1, 2008 in 
which he alleged claims for breach of contract and negligence against Defendant/ 
Appellee Epic Engineering, Inc. ("Epic"). Epic filed separate motions for partial 
summary judgment on each of Mr. Ross's claims, and the trial court heard oral argument 
on both motions on July 22, 2010. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court granted 
Epic's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action for 
Negligence and denied Epic's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's First 
Cause of Action for Breach of Contract. 
The trial court set a trial date for May 19 and 20, 2011 and set a final pretrial 
hearing for April 28, 201L The trial court also ordered that any motions in limine be filed 
on or before April 22, 2011. On April 20, 2011, Epic filed a Motion in Limine to Exclude 
the Expert Testimony of James E. Nordquist, PE. At the final pretrial hearing on April 
28, 2011, the trial court granted Epic's Motion in Limine. Upon granting the Motion in 
Limine, the trial court, sua sponte, reopened the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
on Plaintiff's First Cause of Action for Breach of Contract and granted that Motion based 
solely upon its ruling on Epic's Motion in Limine. The Court entered its written order 
granting Epic's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on May 23, 2011. Mr. Ross filed a 
Notice of Appeal on June 17, 2011. 
3 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
GENERAL FACTS 
Appellant and Appellee entered into a contract whereby Appellee was to provide 
engineering services for the construction of a commercial building in Roosevelt, Utah. 
(R. at 2.) Appellee actually visited the construction site, conducted a topographic survey 
of the building site, and drafted a stamped set of construction drawings and calculations 
for the construction of the commercial building. (R. at 2, 267.) Relying upon Appellee's 
engineering expertise, Appellant proceeded to construct the building according to the 
plans that had been revised, stamped, and approved by Appellee. (R. at 2.) 
Since completion of the commercial building in February 2007, significant settling 
of the building has occurred. (R. at 2.) Three-fourths of the building has settled between 
three to four inches since the building's completion. (R. at 2.) 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On or about July 22, 2010, the trial court heard argument on Appellee's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs First Cause of Action for Breach of Contract. 
(R. at 674.) At that hearing, the Court ruled that genuine issues of material fact existed 
and denied Appellee's Motion. (R. at 700.) The court specifically stated, on the record, 
that 
there are disputed facts in this matter regarding 1) what the contractual 
rights were, because nobody seems to be able to come up with a contract 
that anybody agrees they signed, and 2) what the professional duty of care, 
I believe, is disputed as far as the different experts are concerned. 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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(R. at 700.) The trial court also ruled that a material disputed fact between the 
parties was "what the contract is" and also stated that, "[a]lone, what the contract 
is requires presentation of evidence." (R. at 700.) 
The trial court then ruled that a professional duty of care analysis would only be 
relevant if the factfinder could not establish what the parameters of the agreement were 
between the parties, and that Appellant had presented facts sufficient to create a genuine 
issue of material fact as to the issue of a duty of care. (R. at 700-01.) The trial court also 
ruled that "Plaintiff has presented facts that, if beheved by a jury," he could prevail. (R. at 
700.) Based upon this ruling, the trial court entered a written order re: Defendant's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs First Cause of Action for Breach of 
Contract on or about July 30, 2010. (R. at 391.) 
On or about November 1, 2010, the trial court held a telephone conference in 
which it set a trial date (May 19, 2011) as well as a date (April 22, 2011) by which the 
parties were obligated to file any motions in limine. (R. at 704-710.) The trial court 
memorialized these dates in a written Pretrial Order entered on November 29, 2010. (R. 
at 404.) Then, on March 16, 2011, the trial court, sua sponte, set a final pretrial hearing 
for April 28, 2011 (which was only four business days and six calendar days after the 
deadline for the filing of any motions in limine). (R. at 407-408.) 
At no time during the telephone conference on November 1, 2010 or at any time 
thereafter did the trial court inform the parties that all briefing regarding any motions in 
limine was to be complete and submitted to the trial court for consideration prior to the 
pretrial hearing on April 28, 2011. (R. at 407-408; 704-710.) 
.. . . • • 5 
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On April 20, 2011, Appellee filed a Motion in Limine to Exclude the Expert 
Testimony of James E. Nordquist. (R. at 491.) Mr. Nordquist was an expert that Plaintiff 
had disclosed during the discovery phase of the litigation between the parties. (R. at 53.) 
Appellee served the Motion in Limine upon Appellant by U.S. Mail. (R. at 493.) 
On April 28, 2011, which was only eight days (six business days) after Appellee 
had filed the Motion in Limine and eleven days prior to the date on which Appellant was 
obligated to respond to the Motion in Limine under the requirements of Rule 7(c) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial court heard argument on Appellee's Motion in 
Limine. (R. at 712-13.) Counsel for Appellant objected to the trial court's decision to 
hear argument on April 28, 2011, stating on the record that Appellant had not yet had the 
time granted by Rule 7(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to respond to Appellee's 
Motion in Limine and had not prepared to argue the Motion at the pretrial hearing. (R. at 
659, 713-714.) The trial court overruled the objection, based in part, at least, upon the 
trial court's apparent understanding that a rule exists that allows a party only five days to 
file a response to a motion in limine. (R. at 713.) 
The trial court ruled that the Appellee's Motion in Limine stood unopposed and 
that Appellant could only respond to the Motion in Limine in oral argument. (R. at 713.) 
After hearing argument on the Motion in Limine, the trial court granted Appellee's 
Motion in Limine. (R. at 735.) The trial court's decision to hear the Motion in Limine at 
the final pretrial hearing was neither disclosed before the actual hearing nor stipulated to 
by the parties and it left Appellant without any opportunity to present (1) a written 
6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
opposition to the Motion in Limine or (2) any facts, other than generalized proffer during 
oral argument, that would support Appellant's position. 
The trial court also, sua sponte, reopened the Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment on Plaintiffs First Cause of Action for Breach of Contract and granted that 
Motion based solely upon its ruling on Appellee's Motion in Limine. (R. at 736-37.) The 
trial court ruled, through the written order entered on May 23, 2011, that "[w]ithout 
expert testimony [Appellant] will be unable to establish that [Appellee] breached the 
parties' contract," that "[t]he expert evidence offered by [Appellee] to demonstrate that 
[Appellee] performed its contractual duties stands unrebutted," that "[i]t is the 
responsibility of the contractor, as a matter of law, 'to be familiar with the conditions in 
the subsurface of the ground,'" and that, "the dispute over the exact terms of the parties' 
contract is not material and does not prevent judgment as a matter of law on [Appellant's] 
breach of contract claim." (R. at 658-662.) Because Plaintiff had only a claim for breach 
of contract pending for trial, the trial court's ruling disposed of all of Plaintiffs 
remaining claims, and the case was dismissed with prejudice. (R. at 658-662.) 
FACTS RELEVANT TO MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Appellant contacted Appellee in early 2006 to retain Appellee's services for the 
design of a small commercial building that Appellant intended to build in Roosevelt, 
Utah. (R. at 120.) Appellant discussed his general needs and ideas for tiie building with 
Appellee's engineer, Adam Huff, P.E. (R. at 120.) After this meeting, Appellant signed 
the first page of the Epic Engineering, P.C. Short Form Consulting Services Contract as 
well as Exhibit A of that Contract (titled Project Task Order No. 1). (R. at 261.) 
7 
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Appellee contends that a second page of the Contract exists and that Appellant 
agreed to the provisions therein. (R. at 121.) Appellant disputes that he ever saw page 2 
of the Contract, and Appellee never produced a copy of that page 2 that Appellant sent to 
Appellee when he returned both page 1 and Exhibit A of the Contract to Appellee. (R. at 
261.) Facsimile notations within the purported Contract presented by Appellee 
demonstrate that Appellant sent page 1 and Exhibit A to Appellee, but did not send page 
2 to Appellee (the purported page 2 contains no facsimile notations). (R. at 147-149, 
261.) 
Page 2 of the purported Contract (which Appellant specifically denies he ever saw 
or agreed to) includes a paragraph 10, which states that Appellee's services would be 
rendered without any warranty other than that Appellee would perform in accordance 
with a degree of care and skill generally exercised by professionals performing similar 
work under similar conditions. (R. at 148.) Appellant specifically denies that he ever saw 
or agreed to this paragraph (or any of the provisions on the purported page 2 of the 
contract). (R. at 237.) Appellee produced, at different times during the briefing stage of 
its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, different versions of the purported page 2 and 
was unable to ever definitively state which page 2 Appellant apparently accepted. (R. at 
147-149, 156-160.) 
Exhibit A to the Contract includes a description of the work that Appellee was to 
undertake pursuant to the Contract; however, Appellant disputes that the end work 
product as contemplated by Exhibit A was limited to a stamped set of construction 
drawings and calculations for submission for a building permit. (R. at 149, 262.) 
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Appellant specifically contracted for civil engineering services that included structural 
engineering and a promise by Appellee to design a structure that was structurally sound, a 
good building, and one that would not fall. (R. at 262.) In other words, Appellant 
specifically contracted for designs for a structure that was fit to be built on his specific 
property. (R. at 262, 274.) 
:..,. Both parties designated engineer experts as witnesses in this case; appellant 
designated a geotechnical/soils engineer and Appellee designated a structural engineer. 
(R. at 53-69, 73-81.) Neither expert undertook any specialized study to determine an 
industry standard of care and whether or not Appellee met that industry standard of care. 
(R. at 271-272.) Appellant's expert had previously testified, through a disclosed expert 
report, that, based upon his professional experience, a licensed engineer that looked at the 
property in question in this case would (or at least should) immediately be concerned 
about the obvious fill and slope on the property. (R. at 271.) Appellee did nothing to warn 
or otherwise notify Appellant of the fill and slope problems on the property prior to, 
during, or after creating plans for the construction of the commercial building. (R. at 695-
697.) 
FACTS RELEVANT TO MOTION IN LIMINE 
Appellee's Motion in Limine argued Appellant's expert was not qualified to offer 
any opinion regarding the standard of care applicable to structural engineers, contractors, 
or excavators and that Appellant's expert had no opinion regarding what Appellee was 
required to do, or failed to do, pursuant to its contract with Appellant. (R. at 494-567.) 
9 • • 
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Based upon the purported lack of opinion and expertise, Appellee moved that the trial 
court exclude any testimony by Appellant's expert at trial. (R. at 491-493.) 
Because the trial court heard argument on the Motion in Limine six business days 
after the Motion was mailed to Appellant, Appellant had not prepared or filed any written 
response to the Motion in Limine. (R. at 713-714.) Appellant was unable to present any 
details (either through written opposition to the Motion in Limine or through 
documentary submission at the hearing) regarding the expert's 32 years of experience 
dealing with soil settlement issues (including numerous interactions with structural 
engineers) in residential and commercial structures as well as the expert's specific 
knowledge and expertise regarding the specific facts of this case to the trial court. (R. at -
720-23.) The trial court's position was that the Appellee's Motion in Limine was 
unopposed (R. at 714) and, after hearing oral argument, granted Appellee's Motion in 
Limine prior to receiving any formal response from Appellant (despite generalized 
proffer from Appellant regarding the content of such a formal response). (R. at 713-734.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court's decision to reverse its prior ruling and grant summary judgment 
that it had previously denied was in error, and this Court should reverse the trial court's 
entry of summary judgment on Appellant's claim for breach of contract. The trial court 
weighed disputed facts and ignored Appellant's genuine dispute regarding the actual 
content of the contract; in doing so, the trial court inappropriately acted as a finder of 
feCt.--- ; - - -: — - ~ < --,-•-. -
The trial court also imposed an obligation upon Appellant to demonstrate a 
standard of care in order to maintain his claim for breach of contract. Such an imposition 
was improper, as it is irrelevant to Appellant's claim for breach of contract. The trial 
court's application of Smith v. Frandsen as an additional justification for summary 
judgment was improper; the Smith case has no application in the breach of contract 
context. 
The trial court's decision to exclude Appellant's expert witness should also be 
reversed. The trial court, without prior notice to the parties, truncated the time for 
Appellant to respond to Appellee's Motion in Limine. The trial court, in justifying its 
actions, stated that motions in limine are subject to a different rule that allows only five 
days for a party to respond. Such a rale does not exist. The trial court abused its 
discretion when it excluded Appellant's expert witness without allowing Appellant to 
even formally respond to Appellee's Motion. 
That decision deprived Appellant of an opportunity to respond to the Motion and 
proffer vital foundational evidence that would have supported the expert's qualification 
11 
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as an expert that is competent to testify at trial. The trial court erred when it excluded the 
expert based upon him not being a structural engineer. Appellant's expert is a licensed 
engineer that has years and years of experience dealing with the exact issues that were 
going to be tried in this case. The trial court erred when it excluded the witness simply 
because he is not a structural engineer. 
[This space intentionally left blank.] 
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ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred when it granted Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Plaintiffs claim for breach of contract. The trial court's prior ruling and order denying 
the Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment was correct, and the trial court did not 
have a basis to reopen the previously-decided Motion and reverse its decision. -
Furthermore, the trial court's decision to exclude aU of the expert test^ 
Appellant's engineering expert was incorrect; as the trial court had previously ruled when 
it initially considered (and denied) the Motion for Summary Judgment, such testimony 
would be relevant if the factfinder was unable to determine the parameters of the contract 
between the parties. Finally, the trial court's position that Appellant was subject to an 
unstated rule that required a response to a motion in limine within five days and that 
Appellee's Motion in Limine stood unopposed was incorrect. No such five day rule 
exists, and Appellant was entitled to file a formal response to Appellee's Motion in 
Lknine. 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT REVERSED ITS PRIOR 
DECISION AND GRANTED APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
Summary judgment is proper where there is no genuine issue of material fact and 
where the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(c). When a court addresses a motion for summary judgment, the court's function is 
not to weigh disputed evidence or to decide which side has the stronger case. Rather, the 
court's "sole inquiry should be whether material issues of fact exist." Draper City v. 
Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah 1995). 
13 
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On a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party is not required to 
"prove" its case in order to defeat the motion. Rather, the nonmoving party is only 
required to submit evidence "sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact." Kleinert v. 
Kimball Elevator Co., 854 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). In addition, if there is 
"any doubt or uncertainty concerning questions of fact, the doubt should be resolved in 
favor of the opposing party [and] the court must evaluate all the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences fairly drawn from the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
party opposing summary judgment." Bow en v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 
1982). Finally, the nonmoving party's evidence is to be believed for purposes of the 
motion, and if there is a conflict in the evidence as to a material fact, the motion must be 
denied. See, e.g., Draper City, 888 P.2d at 1100-01. 
In this case, the trial court initially ruled that Appellee was not entitled to 
summary judgment on Appellant's claim for breach of contract because a genuine issue 
of material fact existed as to the terms of the contract. The trial court also ruled that, if the 
fact finder would be unable to determine the terms of the contract, expert testimony to 
determine a general standard of care that the factfinder would then use to determine the 
parameters of the parties' contractual relationship would be relevant. However, this 
expert inquiry, if it happened at all, would only be relevant after the factfinder (in this 
case, a jury) determined what the terms of the contract actually were. The trial court's 
position after considering the Appellee's Motion in Limine completely ignored the first 
genuine issue of fact—what contract existed between the parties. 
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A. A genuine issue of material fact exists regarding what the contract between 
Appellant and Appellee required Appellee to do; therefore, summary 
judgment was not appropriate. 
When a court is presented with an issue of "a contractual obligation," it will "first 
look to the contract and construe its terms to give effect to the intentions of the parties." 
The Doctors' Co. v. Drezga, 2009 UT 60, ^ 12, 218 P.3d 598. However, a trial court 
cannot interpret a contract as a matter of law if ambiguity exists within the contract's 
terms. See Cafe Rio, Inc. v. Larkin-Gifford-Overton, LLC, 2009 UT 27, % 25, 207 P.3d 
1235. An "[ajmbiguity exists if a provision of a contract is capable of more than one 
reasonable interpretation because of uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other 
facial deficiencies." The Doctors' Co., 2009 UT 60, % 12 (internal citations omitted). 
To determine if a provision within a contract is ambiguous, "any relevant evidence 
must be considered" to determine whether or not "contrary, tenable interpretations" exist. 
Daines v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, ffif 26, 30, 190 P.3d 1269 (internal citations omitted). 
Any competing "interpretations argued for must be reasonably supported by the language 
of the contract." Id. at ^ 30 (internal citations omitted.) If "there is an ambiguity in the 
terms of the contract," a court "may ... ascertain the parties' intent from extrinsic 
evidence." Bodell Constr. Co. v. Robbins, 2009 UT 52, \ 19, 215 P.3d 933. If that 
extrinsic evidence points to two reasonable interpretations of the same contractual 
language, the contract cannot be interpreted as a matter of law and summary judgment 
upon the meaning of an ambiguous contractual provision is not appropriate. See Parduhn 
v. Bennett, 2002 UT 93, \ 29, 61 P.3d 982 (J. Durrant, dissenting) (citing to prior Utah 
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law as support for the principle that "where ambiguity exists in a contract, the intent of 
the parties is a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact"). 
Ambiguity exists regarding Appellee's obligations under the contract at issue in 
this case. Appellant asserts that he interpreted the contract for structural engineering 
services to include precautions, warnings, and/or recommendations regarding the 
possibility of unsuitable soils present upon the property upon which the building was 
constructed. Appellant's interpretation is buttressed by his own expert's statements that 
such an interpretation was not unreasonable and that a licensed engineer should have 
m 
been concerned by the contours and appearance of the Property. Even Appellee's expert 
stated that a licensed engineer "that deals with excavation and buildings" would "have 
[the] responsibility to see that [a building is] being put on native material." (R. at 298-
299.) 
Appellee argues that the contract included a specific standard of care on page 2 of 
the contract. However, whether or not page 2 was even part of the contract between the 
parties is a hotly contested issue. Appellee has supported its own claims that page 2 was 
part of the contract and that the standard of care included within that page 2 with 
evidence; however, simply supporting those claims with evidence does not entitle 
Appellee to summary judgment. See also Express Recovery Services, Inc. v. Rice, 2005 
UT App 495, Tf 3, 125 P.3d 108 (stating that ambiguities within a contract are construed 
against the drafter of the contract). 
The trial court's order, that "without expert testimony Ross will be unable to 
establish that Epic breached the contract," has no basis, for the terms of the contract have 
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not yet been established. The first time that the trial court considered the Motion for 
Summary Judgment, the trial court specifically ruled that "nobody seems to be able to 
come up with a contract that anybody agrees they signed." (R. at 700.) Only if Epic's 
page 2 is adopted as part of the contract (which the trial court specifically refused to do 
when it ruled on the Motion for Summary Judgment) does this order have any basis. 
However, the trial court has no authority, when considering a summary judgment motion, 
to determine a disputed fact (and, in fact, specifically ruled that it could not determine 
whether page 2 was part of the contract). 
B. Appellee's position (which the trial court adopted) that Appellant is 
obligated to establish a standard of care for his breach of contract claim is 
incorrect 
To establish a claim for breach of contract, Appellant must show that a contract 
exists, that he performed under the terms of the contract, that Appellee breached the 
contract, and that he suffered damages. See Bair v. Axiom Design, LLC, 2001 UT 20, f 
14, 20 P.3d 388. None of these elements requires that Appellant present evidence of a 
standard of care or that Appellee violated a standard of care. Neither the trial court nor 
Appellee ever identified one case or any other governing in which a party is obligated to 
separately establish some independent standard of care when suing on for breach of 
contract. In fact, the entire point of the economic loss rule, as applied in Utah, is that, 
unless an independent duty recognized by Utah law exists, a party is limited to the duties 
created by the parties' agreement. See Hermansenv. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, f^ [ 16-17, 48 
P.3d235. 
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C. Smith v. Frandsen is not applicable to this case and was not a valid basis 
for summary judgment. 
The trial court's ruling that Smith v. Frandsen, 2004 UT 55, 94 P.3d 919 absolves 
Appellee of any possible liability for breach of contract is incorrect. The Smith case 
identified an independent duty, to be enforced through tort claims, that builder-
contractor-owners have when selling residential property to a homeowner. The Smith 
case in no way addresses breach of contract claims (such a claim was not even at issue in 
the Smith case), and it certainly does not stand for the proposition that Appellee was 
absolved of a contractual duty based upon a contractor's presence on the property (a 
contractor that had no ownership interest in the property prior to Appellant's purchase of 
the property). Smith is not applicable to this case, and the trial court's use of Smith as 
justification for summary judgment is in error. 
D. The trial court's determination of the dispute over the exact terms of the 
parties' contract was unjustifiably narrow. 
Appellant, in his initial opposition to Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
clearly and substantively disputed Appellee's assertion that Appellant received and 
agreed to be bound by a page 2 of Appellee's short form contract. The trial court 
recognized this dispute and even pointed out that Appellee could not even establish 
which page 2 it contended Appellant saw and agreed to follow. It was this dispute that 
was the central reason for the trial court's initial decision to deny the Motion for 
Summary Judgment. (R. at 692-93, 700.) However, when the trial court reconsidered 
Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment, the trial court simply compared the 
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differences between the different versions of page 2 and determined that the differences 
were not material. (R. at 660-61, 736-37.) 
In essence, the trial court ignored the dispute regarding the validity of any version 
of page 2, despite Appellant making such a dispute very clear. The trial court had no 
authority to simply disregard Appellant's dispute of the validity of page 2 (especially 
after the same trial court had refused to disregard the dispute during argument on the 
actual Motion for Summary Judgment), and in doing so, the trial court weighed evidence 
and essentially agreed with Appellee's contention that page 2 was binding. 
H. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT EXCLUDED APPELLANT'S 
EXPERT WITNESS. 
The trial court should not have excluded Appellant's expert witness with regards 
to Appellee's standard of care in the event that the trial court determined that the contract 
between the parties (to the issue of whatever default duty Appellee may owe to 
Appellant) is ambiguous. When a "matter at issue requires special knowledge not held by 
the trier of fact, the standard of care in a trade or profession generally must be determined 
by testimony of witnesses in the same trade or profession." Macintosh v. Staker Pasnng & 
Construction Co., 2009 UT App 96, 2009 Utah App. LEXIS 97, *3 (internal citations 
omitted). 
Appellant's expert is a licensed engineer, and therefore is in the same trade or 
profession as Appellee. Appellant's expert stated unequivocally that "[a] licensed 
engineer, looking at the lot in question, would (or should have been) immediately be 
concerned about the obvious fill and the slope on the lot." (R. at 323.) Appellant's expert 
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also stated that expecting a structural engineer to recognize such a concern and exercise a 
level of care that "would include pointing out the possibility of problematic fill soil," is 
legitmate. (R. at 323.) 
That Appellant's expert did not undertake a more detailed study regarding an 
overall standard of care for engineers in the area is inapposite. Utah law does not require 
that he do so? and he based his recommendations upon his professional experience. 
Notably, Appellee's expert conceded that he, too, relied upon nothing other than his 
professional experience to make his determinations regarding Appellee's standard of 
care. (See R. at 293 (stating that Appellee's expert established the standard of care "[j]ust 
by professional experience").) The position that Appellant's expert is obligated to 
undertake additional research and that Appellant is obligated to incur additional costs to 
support Appellant's evidence regarding standard of care, but that Appellee's expert can 
rest solely upon his professional experience, is an untenable one. 
Utah law requires that an expert use his expertise gained from working in the same 
profession as Appellee to formulate an expert opinion. Whether or not the expert utilized 
solely his professional experience or relied upon further targeted research would go 
towards the weight to be given to specific expert testimony and opinions, not the 
admissibility of the testimony and opinions. In fact, the trial court ignored the proffer 
from Appellant at the hearing regarding Appellant's expert's numerous years of 
experience dealing with the exact issue to which he would testify in this case.l 
1
 As explained further below, Appellant was denied an opportunity to specifically 
demonstrate the foundation necessary to qualify Appellant's expert in this case, as the 
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Therefore, the trial court's position that Appellant's expert lacks the expertise to 
testify regarding the duties of structural engineers, despite the expert being a licensed 
engineer, is directly contradictory to the standard created by the Macintosh case. The trial 
court erred in interpreting the standard applicable to Appellant's expert. This Court owes 
no deference to the trial court's decision to exclude Appellant's expert witness, and it 
should reverse that decision by the trial court. 
IH. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DISREGARDED RULE 7(c) OF THE 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
The trial court's decision to disregard Rule 7(c) was both legally incorrect as well 
as an abuse of discretion. The trial court had no justification for, without any prior notice, 
truncating the Appellant's ability to file a formal response to Appellee's Motion in 
Limine. This Court should reverse the trial court's decision. 
A. The trial court abused its discretion in excluding Appellant's expert witness 
when it did not even allow Appellant to formally oppose the Motion in 
Limine. 
To the extent that this Court defers to the trial court's decision to exclude 
Appellant's expert, the trial court abused its discretion when it excluded the expert. The 
trial court decided the Motion in Limine at the pretrial hearing despite giving no prior 
notice, of any kind, to any party that the trial court would decide the motions in limine at 
that time. In doing so, the trial court completely disregarded Rule 7(c) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, which states that "[w]ithin ten days after service o the motion and 
trial court did not permit Appellant to file any written response to Appellee's Motion in 
Limine. 
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supporting memorandum, a party opposing the motion shall file a memorandum in 
opposition." 
On November 1, 2010, when the parties participated in a telephonic status 
conference, the trial court set a due date for motions in limine. (R. at 708.) The trial court 
made no indication during that status conference that any deadlines would be compressed 
or that any other timelines, other than those that had governed every aspect of the case up 
to that point, would be used for motions in limine. (R. at 708-710.) Later, on March 16, 
2011, the trial court scheduled a pretrial conference and gave no additional instructions 
regarding timelines to respond to motions filed by April 22, 2011. (R. at 407-408.) At the 
pretrial hearing (which was only eight calendar days after Appellee had mailed its Motion 
in Limine to Appellant), the trial court stated, at the outset, that it considered the Motion 
in Limine to be "unopposed at this time." (R. at 714.) Upon Appellant's objection to the 
undisclosed truncated briefing schedule, the trial court then allowed Appellant only to 
respond orally, at the time of the hearing, to the arguments supporting Appellee's Motion. 
(R. at 714). 
In support of the trial court's position that Appellant should have opposed the 
Motion in Limine by the time of the pretrial hearing, the trial court stated that "in a 
motion in limine you have five days to file a response." (R. at 714.) When Appellant's 
counsel indicated that he was unaware of such a rule, the trial court provided no reference 
to any rule that would support the trial court's position. (R. at 714.) The trial court also 
stated that it had given ten days between (apparently) the deadline for filing motions in 
limine and the pretrial hearing. (R. at 714.) Such a statement was incorrect, as the 
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deadline for filing motions in limine was April 22, and the pretrial conference was held 
six days later (on April 28, 2011). 
Appellant then argued against the Motion in Limine, and several times specifically 
referred to his right to at least provide a particularized and specific proffer of the expert's 
qualifications. (R. at 720-21, 730-31.) Again, despite Appellant notifying the trial court 
of this right, the trial court disregarded Appellant's requests and ruled on the Motion. In 
making this ruling, the trial court imposed its own calendar limitations of which 
Appellant had no notice and to which Appellant was unable to adjust (as Appellant was 
given no time, after disclosure of the trial court's intentions on the day of the pretrial 
hearing, to file any formal response of any kind). Such actions were an abuse of 
discretion. The trial court, in essence, expected counsel to anticipate the trial court's 
otherwise unstated intent. Such an expectation is unreasonable; this Court should reverse 
the exclusion of Appellant's expert and allow Appellant to respond to the Motion in 
Limine as set forth in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
B. The trial court erred when it ruled that a rule requiring that responses to 
motions in limine be filed five days after sennce supersedes Rule 7(c) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Utah's civil procedure rules "govern the procedure in the courts of the state of 
Utah in all actions, suits, and proceedings of a civil nature." Utah R. Civ. P. 1(a). The 
rules are to "be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action." Id. These rules "are designed to provide a pattern of 
regularity of procedure which the parties and the courts can follow and rely upon." 
Brigham Young University v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 2007 UT 17, \ 29, 156 P.3d 782. 
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The trial court's purported justifications for ignoring Rule 7(c) and imposing a 
compressed briefing schedule for the Motion in Limine is not supported by any prior 
order that the trial court made in this case. It is not supported by any agreement between 
the parties. When the trial court imposed its own ad hoc rule upon how the Motion in 
Limine was to be briefed, the Appellant was deprived of his right to a just determination 
of every action and was prejudiced for relying upon the very rule that governs the 
briefing schedule for motions filed in civil cases. The trial court supplanted Rule 7(c)'s 
time allowances with reference to a non-existent rule purportedly applicable to motions in 
limine. Such a decision was incorrect, and this Court should reverse it. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred when it granted summary judgment against Appellant and 
dismissed his claim for breach of contract. The trial court also erred and abused its 
discretion in deciding to exclude Appellant's expert witness. This Court should reverse 
both of these rulings. 
Respectfully submitted this 28th day of October 2011. 
HILL , J O 6 N S £ ) N <^SCHMUTZ?1L.C. 
snberry 
Harris 
A ttorneys for Pe titioners/Appellants 
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Attorneys for Epic Engineering, P.C. 
IN THE EIGHT JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JASON ROSS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
, 
EPIC ENGINEERING, .P.C, 
Defendant, 
" i ORDER GRANTING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE 
TO EXCLUDE THE EXPERT 
TESTIMONY OF JAMES E. 
NORDQUIST, P.E. AND GRANTING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON BREACH 
OF CONTRACT CLAIM 
Civil No. 080800020 
Judge Edwin T. Peterson 
On April 28,2011, a final pretrial hearing was held in this matter in Duchesne, Utah. 
The Court heard oral arguments on a motion in limine filed by Defendant Epic Engineering, P.C. 
("Epic") to exclude James E. Nordquist. P.E. from testifying as an expert witness on behalf of 
Plaintiff Jason Ross ("Ross"). Appearing on behalf of Epic, were Brent E. Johnson and Rebecca 
A. Ryon of Holland & Hart LLP. Aaron R. Harris of Hill, Johnson & Schmutz, L.C. appeared on 
behalf of Ross. j 
After carefully considering Epic's motion in limine and the supporting documentation 
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submitted therewith, the arguments of counsel, and revisiting the parties' briefing on the 
summary judgment motion filed by Epic seeking judgment as a matter of law on Ross' first 
cause of action for breach of contract1, the Court now makes the following ruling: 
EPIC'S MOTION IN LIMINE 
1. Epic argues that Mr. Nordquist, a geotechnical engineer, is not qualified to opine 
as to the duties of structural engineers, such as Epic, and that the other opinions that Mr. 
Nordquist would offer go to undisputed matters, are contrary to Utah law, or are otherwise 
irrelevant. 
2. The Court agrees. Under Utah Rule of Evidence 702, a witness must have the 
necessary knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education to be qualified as an expert. .The 
testimony offered by the expert must also be helpful to the jury in understanding the evidence or 
determining a fact in issue, 
3. Mr. Nordquist lacks the necessary knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education to be qualified as an expert as to the duties of structural engineers. Mr. Nordquist.. 
testified in deposition that he has no expert opinion to offer on the standard of care observed by 
structural engineers as it relates to the issues present in this case. 
4. Mr. Nordquist's opinions and the proffered testimony as to the cause of the 
settlement of Ross' building (the presence of unconsolidated fill material on the site) and that 
using piers to stabilize the building would be an appropriate remedy go to issues that are not 
1
 Epic's motion for summary judgment on Ross' breach of contract claim was also premised on a challenge to Mr. 
Nordquist's qualifications and the admissibility of his expert opinions. The arguments presented in Epic's prior 
motion largely track the motion in limine now before the Court. Ross objected to the Court-considering Epic's 
motion in limine before his time for responding had expired, however, Ross opposed the prior motion for summary 
judgment in writing and was given the opportunity to raise any additional points in opposition to the motion in 
limine at the final pretrial hearing. 
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disputed by Epic. Therefore, Mr. Nordquist5 s testimony is neither necessary nor would it be 
helpful to the trier of fact. , 
5. Mr. Nordquist's opinion on the capabilities of general contractors is directly 
contrary to Utah law. In Smith v. Frandsen, 94 P.3d 919 (Utah 2004), the Utah Supreme Court 
held that "the law imputes to builders and contractors a high degree of specialized knowledge 
and expertise with regard to residential construction," Id, at 925. "In particular, builder-. 
contractors are expected to be familiar with conditions in the subsurface of the ground." Id. 
(concluding that although the defendant had limited experience, it was "deemed to possess the 
knowledge of a reasonably prudent builder-contractor under similar circumstances, and, as a 
matter of law, a builder of ordinary prudence would have discovered the insufficient compaction 
on [the building site]"), 
6. Accordingly, Mr. Nordquist's opinion that "when digging the footings a machine 
operator or contractor wouldn't necessarily be able to determine if the soil they were digging into 
was native or fill" is inadmissible. 
7. For these reasons, and those stated on the record at the final pretrial hearing, 
Epic's motion in limine to exclude Mr. Nordquist from testifymg as an expert witness on behalf 
Ross is hereby GRANTED. _ 
EPIC'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT : 
7. Without expert testimony Ross will be unable to establish that Epic breached the 
parties' contract. 
8. The expert evidence offered by Epic to demonstrate that Epic performed its 
contractual duties stands unrebutted. , " 
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9. Furthermore, Epic's position that it was the failure of Ross' contractor to ascertain 
the subsurface conditions that caused Ross' damages finds support in the controlling Utah 
authority set forth in Smith v. Frandsen, 94 P.3d 919 (Utah 2004). It is the responsibility of the 
contractor, as a matter of law, fctto be familiar with the conditions in the subsurface of the 
ground." Id, at 925. 
7. As a result, the dispute over the exact terms of the parties' contract is not material 
and does not prevent judgment as a matter of law on Ross' breach of contract claim. 
8. Therefore, for the foregoing reasons and those stated on the record at the final 
pretrial hearing, Epic's motion for summary judgment on Ross' first cause of action for breach of 
contract is hereby GRANTED. -.---• 
SO ORDERED this Tb day of jY\fr<J 2011. 
5095854__2.DOC 
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